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I. Introduction 
 
 
 After more than a quarter of a century of the transition process beginning in the late 
1970s, China is now probably one of the most competitive market economies in the world. In 
many industries in the country, one can witness an overwhelming number of firms engaging in 
throat-cutting type of competition. Growth in demand invites almost endless new entries and 
building-up of new capacities, which inevitably push profitability down to the extreme low. 
While the government occasionally tries in vain to control entries into or investment in those 
sectors, this “excessive” competition so is often alleged eventually turns out to be the very 
driving force of the industrial development in contemporary China. 
 One can reasonably expect that this apparent progress in transition to a market 
economy would accompany an ever-dwindling share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
massive privatization. It surely does, at least in many industrial sub-sectors where market entry 
is relatively easy. But when we look into the value-added share of broadly-defined state-owned 
firms that includes corporatized companies in which the State retains dominant equity, we find 
that the presence of state-ownership has shown little sign of decline in recent years. Rather, it 
has been more or less stabilized at the level of one third of the industrial value-added and seems 
to be slightly increasing most recently. Besides, even in some of the competitive sub-sectors like 
consumer products there remain a handful of state-owned firms successfully surviving harsh 
competitions.  
 The motivation of this paper is to show that, behind these seemingly paradoxical 
phenomena, there are several important dilemmas that China faces in restructuring SOEs, 
especially those of which scale is so large that their fates are likely to incur significant 
influences on regional economies where they are located, industrial sub-sectors to which they 
belong, or even the national economy as a whole. Those dilemmas are of politico-economic or 
purely economic nature rather than political. China is still in the process of finding ways to 
resolve them. This in turn means that potential instabilities in corporate governance associated 
with state ownership would remain in place in the foreseeable future. 
 The following sections are organized as follows. Section II roughly sketches the 
progress of the reform of SOEs in China so far, focusing mainly on the tide of privatization of 
small and medium SOEs and corporatization of large enterprises that has accelerated since the 
second half of the 1990s. Figures that show the persistence of state-ownership are provided. 
Sections III and IV focus on two “polar” cases of large state-owned enterprises and explore 
dilemmas they face in restructuring themselves. Section V concludes with presenting some 
future prospects. 
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II. China’s SOE reform: Progress so far 
 
 
 During the first decade beginning in the early 1980s, reform of SOEs had focused 
almost solely on enhancing the managerial autonomy, which means delegation of managerial 
decision-making rights from supervisory government bureaus (either central or local, depending 
on the original affiliation of the SOE in question) to the management. This early stage of SOE 
reform, in line with increasing pressure from newly-emerging competitors such as township and 
village enterprises (TVEs), undoubtedly promoted more market-oriented behavior of SOEs. 
Econometric studies that measure productivity growth in China’s industrial sector show that in 
this period SOEs as a whole experienced improvement in efficiency, while the margin of 
improvement was slim in comparison with non-SOEs, especially TVEs1.  
Aside from the efficiency improvement of more or less limited scale, the reform that 
focused on managerial autonomy also produced a new dilemma, i.e. the balance between the 
autonomy of the management and the control right of the state as the single largest shareholder 
of SOEs. Government bureaus in charge of supervising SOEs were obliged to monitor the 
management to prevent managerial slack or embezzlement of state-owned assets by the 
management. At the same time, excess intervention was apt to affect efficiency, which in turn 
would result in instant deterioration of financial performance under the increasingly competitive 
market environment. It was always almost impossible to draw the line between legitimate 
monitoring as the state shareholder and inefficient government intervention. These limitations in 
the first phase of the reform led to the second stage of reform in China: privatization of small 
and medium firms and corporatization of large firms.  
 
Upsurge of privatization 
 The first turning point came in the early 1990s, when the Communist Part of China 
declared that the goal of the economic reform is the realization of a so-called “socialist market 
economy.” which virtually means full transition to a standard market economy, with the State 
keeping control by way of state ownership in “key sectors” (although exactly what “key sectors” 
means has never been clearly stated). As for the enterprise reform, the Part Communiqué in 
1993 authorized local governments to experiment with “various measures” including 
straightforward sellout of small SOEs.  
This political sea change came at the moment when local governments saw financial 
performance of small and medium SOEs under their jurisdiction deteriorate seriously owing 
mainly to ever-increasing competition with TVEs and private enterprises. This triggered acute 
                                                        
1 See Jefferson and Singh (eds.) (1999).  
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budgetary crises especially in county- or ward-level governments, which used to depend on tax 
from SOEs for much of their revenue. As the new policy had become more firmly confirmed 
through the second half of the 1990s, a growing number of local governments, with a view to 
shedding off financial burden, set off to wholesale small and medium SOEs that were mostly 
losing money2.  
 Despite the fact that the process has been underway for a decade, we can by no means 
accurately assess the progress of privatization so far due to unavailability of reliable data. The 
Communist Party of China (the Party) and the government still refrain from officially endorsing 
privatization in order to avoid political disputes. Privatization is, together with other forms of 
reform such as corporatization (which does not necessary involve change of ownership) or 
merger (which may be a merger with another SOE), labeled rather ambiguously as “property 
rights restructuring (???? or ??).” Aside from sample surveys conducted sporadically, no 
official data is published as to the progress of privatization or even “property rights 
restructuring”. Thus, what we can do is to call upon some proxy measures that are likely to 
represent the trend best of all.  
 Among them the most representative one is the number of SOEs published annually 
from Ministry of Finance (Table 1). It is important to note that this statistics covers not only 
traditional SOEs which are wholly owned by the State (????or??????: WSOEs), but 
also corporatized firms of which majority equity is still in the hand of the State3. The latter type 
of firms is officially designated “state-controlled enterprises” (??????: SCEs). We call the 
two categories combined together “broadly-defined SOEs”.       
 The data show that the number of SOEs declined drastically from 1995 to 2003. It is 
quite likely that the trend has remained basically unchanged to date, as another data which I will 
refer to in the next subsection suggests4. During the recent decade the number of SOEs has been 
almost halved. Despite the lack of disaggregated data for recent years, it is apparent that the 
overwhelming majority of the decline is attributable to small-scale firms, most of which fall 
under the jurisdiction of municipal, county, and ward governments. The number of 
medium-scale firms, which usually belong to local governments, declined considerably too. 
 
 
                                                        
2 For privatization of small and medium SOEs, see Tenev et al. [2002] and Chapter 2 of Imai (ed.) [2003]. 
3 To be exact, according to the official definition, following three types of firms are classified as 
“state-controlled enterprises.” 1) Firms of which more than 50 per cent of the equity is owned by the State. 
2) Firms of which the State owns less than 50 per cent of the equity but still is the largest shareholder. 3) 
Firms in which the State is not the largest shareholder but effectively control the management by means 
of agreement with other shareholders. 
4 According to a large-scale survey conducted by the Development Research Center of the State Council 
in 2004, the number of “property rights restructuring” of SOEs increased sharply in 2003 (Zhang [2005]). 
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Table 1  The number of SOEs (excluding the financial sector)
Broadly-defined SOEs 253,525 190,508 173,504 158,712 146,000 137,753 -45.7% *
    Large 8,442 9,283 9,453 9,436 n.a. n.a. 11.8%
    Medium 38,413 27,672 27,527 27,886 n.a. n.a. -27.4%
    Small 206,670 153,553 136,524 121,390 n.a. n.a. -41.3%
    WSOEs 218,582 144,406 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -33.9% **
    SCEs 14,283 32,146 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 125.1% **
Source? 1995-2003: Ministry of Finance. 2004: State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.
Note)  1) The criteria of the scale of firms is the one prior to the revision in 2004.  2) *1995-2003. **1995-2000.
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
1995-2002
change
2004
 
 Figure 1 summarizes the number of bankruptcy cases of SOEs filed to the court. As 
bankruptcies of large SOEs are strictly controlled by the government, the great majority of the 
cases are supposed to be those of smaller firms. Accumulative total of the cases filed amounts to 
around one third of the decline in the number of SOEs in the same period. Thus we can assume 
that privatization roughly accounts for the remaining two thirds of the decline.  
 
Figure 1  The number of SOE bankruptcy cases
filed to the court
1,232
3,651
3,060
4,128
2,886
3,926
5,429
4,239 4,127
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1995-2003 Tota1:
32,678
Source) Law Yearbook of China , various years
 
 5
In view of the fact that in 2004 there still remained more than a hundred thousand of 
small and medium SOEs nationwide, full privatization or liquidation of them may take more 
time than conventional wisdom predicts, in spite of prevailing enthusiasm on the side of local 
governments for privatization5. There are a number of factors that may deter smooth transition.  
Surveys show that in many cases privatization of small and medium SOEs take place 
by way of buyout by incumbent managers (management buyout: MBO) or employees including 
managers (management-employee buyout: MEBO) 6 . Privatization by outsiders such as 
acquisition by private businessman remains minority, due probably to factors such as serious 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, aversion on the side of insiders, or just a 
sheer lack of investment value. Whichever way of privatization is to be chosen, pricing of 
state-owned equity is always a controversial issue. Managers or outside investors are often 
alleged to have acquired state equity at “unfair” prices, which usually mean significantly lower 
than the book value (I will return to the pricing issue in section IV). Privatization also frequently 
invites labor disputes. In some cases, employees are forced to buy state equity in return for job 
guarantee.  
These frictions in the process of privatization invite occasional interventions by the 
central government aiming at “institutionalizing” the tide of privatization of small and medium 
SOEs. Local governments often try to avoid letting firms go bankrupt that incurs financial 
burden such as compensation to dismissed workers. Nevertheless, both the central and local 
governments have been convinced that in the long run leaving those small and medium firms 
owned by the State, many of which have been losing money for years, costs much more than 
letting them be privatized or liquidated by whichever way that is feasible. In this context, there 
is little chance that the trend of sweeping privatization of small and medium SOEs will be 
reversed.           
At the same time, it is noteworthy that the number of firms designated as “large”, 
which usually employ more than thousands of workers, shows little sign of decline at least up to 
2002. Then the question is, has the sharp decline in the number of firms led to a shrinking share 
of SOEs in China’s economy? Unfortunately enough, the Ministry of Finance statistics provides 
no data on output or sales of SOEs. In order to find a tentative answer to the above question, we 
need to focus on the industrial sector (mining, manufacturing, and public utilities), of which 
                                                        
5 The pace of the decrease of SOEs varies widely across provinces. While some provinces have their 
SOEs slashed by more than 70 percent during the past decade, in municipalities like Beijing, Shanghai 
and Tianjin the decrease has been relatively moderate (20 to 30 percent). No apparent correlation is found 
between the provincial decrease in the number of SOEs and variables such as per capita GDP, GDP 
growth rate, and fiscal conditions, suggesting political rather than economic environment may play a 
more decisive role in promoting or deterring privatization.  
6 In recent years MBO rather than MEBO has become prevailing because the former is generally superior 
to the latter in terms of efficiency in decision making and incentive structure. See Tenev et al. [2002], 
Chapter 2 of Imai (ed.) [2003], and Zhang [2005]. 
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output data by ownership are available.  
 
Persistence of state-ownership 
Table 2 presents the number of industrial SOEs and their share in the sector in terms of 
value-added. Because of the unavailability of output data that covers all industrial firms, we use 
value-added of the industrial sector in the national income statistics, i.e. the industrial sector’s 
component of GDP, as denominator7.    
 
WSOEs SCEs**
??? ???
1993 n.a. 80,586 n.a. n.a. 51.5 n.a.
1994 87,084 79,731 7,353 n.a. 40.8 n.a.
1995 n.a. 87,905 n.a. n.a. 33.6 n.a.
1996 n.a. 86,982 n.a. n.a. 30.1 n.a.
1997 84,397 74,388 10,009 34.0 28.4 5.6
1998 64,737 n.a. n.a. 33.2 n.a. n.a.
1999 61,301 50,651 10,650 34.6 23.4 11.2
2000 53,489 42,426 11,063 35.3 18.5 16.8
2001 46,767 34,530 12,237 35.7 14.6 21.0
2002 41,125 29,499 11,626 34.2 14.1 20.2
2003 34,280 23,228 11,052 35.5 13.5 22.0
2004 31,750 n.a. n.a. 37.0 n.a. n.a.
2005 29,229 n.a. n.a. 34.2 n.a. n.a.
          ** SCEs includes limited liability companies owned wholly by the State.
Source) National Bureau of Statistics and the author's calculation.
WSOEs SCEs*
SOEs
Total
Note) * Value-added of SOEs divided by GDP produced by the industrial sector. All GDP data
excluding the year 2005 are figures prior to the upward revision announced in 2005.
Table 2  The number and share of SOEs in the industrial sector
Share of SOEs in the sector*
(Value-added, %)
Number of firms
 
 
So far as the number of firms is concerned, the data show a much similar trend as the 
previous all-industry data in Table 1 does. The decline in the number of SOEs is far more 
outstanding than in the case of the all-industry data. WSOEs almost solely account for the 
                                                        
7 From 1997 onward, China’s industrial statistical system has revised so that it covers only (1) all of 
broadly-defined SOEs and (2) non-SOEs of which annual sales are no less than five million Renminbi. As 
a result, the majority of small enterprises are excluded from the statistics. When compiling national 
income statistics, National Bureau of Statistics makes up for this lack of coverage by means of estimation 
based on sample surveys (Xu [2000], p.26).   
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decline. It had also been accompanied by a sharp reduction in the share of the output of WSOEs 
in the industrial sector at least up to 2003, the latest year of which relevant data is available. 
It should be noted, however, that the share of broadly-defined SOEs in the sector has 
shown no apparent sign of decline since the late 1990s. It had been hovering around 34 to 36 
percent until 2002. In 2003 and 2004 it even slightly increased, after which it returned to the 
previous level8.  
While the data remains patchy due to frequent changes of format in original sources, 
this seemingly paradoxical stability of the share of SOEs is undoubtedly attributable to the 
growing share of SCEs that compensates the steep decline of the WSOEs share. Hence our next 
question: what sort of firms are those growing SCEs? Because of the unavailability of 
systematic data that shows the detailed composition of SCEs, it is difficult to get a conclusive 
answer to this question. We can presume, however, that the most important contributors to the 
growth of SCEs are joint stock companies of which the State remains to be the single largest 
shareholder, especially listed companies, which are capable of mobilizing capital through the 
stock markets at low cost. 
The overwhelming majority of the dominant shareholders of companies listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are so-called state-shareholders, i.e. the central 
government, local governments, or SOEs which are entrusted with the state-owned shares (??
?), as Figure 2 indicates. Despite growing number of acquisition of listed companies and initial 
public offerings by private enterprises, sources suggest the dominance of state-shareholders 
remains basically unchanged to date9. Nearly 60 per cent of shares issued by listed companies in 
China are estimated to be owned by the State10. In many cases, state-owned shares are entrusted 
with SOEs which are parent bodies of listed companies.  
Although value-added data of listed companies in the industrial sector consistent with 
the data in Table 2 is not available, the growth of the total sales of listed companies relative to 
GDP supports our presumption that listed companies largely account for the output growth of 
                                                        
8 Whether this increase is real or not remains an issue. Our estimation for the period prior to 2005 does 
not reflect the upward revision of GDP based on the first economic census in 2004. In 2005, the year for 
which the post-census data is used, the estimated share of SOEs decreased. This suggests that pre-census 
statistics seriously underestimated the recent growth of the private sector. 
9 A report compiled by the Research Center of Shanghai Stock Exchange estimates that as of the end of 
June, 2003, only 17.5 per cent of A stock-listed companies are defined as non-state domestic companies 
(Lu and Zhang [2004]). Note that this includes collective companies which are (at least legally) not 
deemed to be private enterprises. 
10 State-owned shares are classified into two distinctive categories. (1) “State shares” (???) that are (at 
least in theory) owned directly by government ministries or local governments. (2) “State-owned legal 
persons’ shares” (?????) that are entrusted with SOEs or other state-owned institutions. Official 
statistics show that state shares account for 51 per cent of shares issued as of the end of 2003. As for the 
latter no systematic data is available. According to some estimates they roughly account no less than half 
of legal persons’ shares (which themselves account for 12.3 per cent of shares issued in the same year).  
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SCEs (Figure 3).  
Figure 2  Composition of listed companies
by the nature of dominant shareholder
No dominant
Shareholder
5.0?
Collectives
2.4?
Employee
shareholders '
associations
0.7?
Foreigners
 0.7?
Indivituals and
families
 10.7?
Note: 1) 1,050 listed companies as of 2001. 2) Companies of which no single
shareholder's share exceeds ten per cent are classified as "No dominant shareholder".
Source: Compiled from Zhang et al. [2002].
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?Figure 3  The ratio of total sales of listed companies
to GDP
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Source) China Listed Company Reports , various  years .
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While China’s large SOEs today are very much diversified, there are two distinctive 
cases in which SOEs remain viable under sharply contrasting market environments. On the one 
hand, in industries where minimum capital requirement is significantly large, SOEs’ dominance 
has not been fundamentally challenged to date. SOEs still take hold of their established 
positions in these industries mainly on account of the oligopolistic nature of the market 
environments (we call it “case I” here). On the other hand, even in some highly competitive 
industries, there still exist a handful of SOEs successfully surviving harsh competition (“case 
II”). Their survival and growth under adverse market environment depends on ingenious 
entrepreneurship of managers per excellence.  
Needless to say, the dichotomy here cannot be too rigorously applied in reality. The 
majority of SOEs probably lie somewhere between the typical case I and II. However, if a SOE 
is endowed with neither an oligopolistic market environment nor a capable manager (i.e. it lies 
in the “middle” of the typical case I and II), the chances are that it is doomed to decline as time 
elapses. Hence the convergence to the two polar cases. 
Notwithstanding the contrasting market environment, many SOEs both in case I and II 
share a common structure: they had their core business reorganized into subsidiary joint stock 
companies (JSCs) and had the JSCs’ shares listed on stock exchanges. This made them capable 
of cashing in on the drastic growth of China’s capital market. In the following two sections, to 
explain the persistence of state corporate ownership in China, we focus on these two distinctive 
types of large SOEs, based primarily on case studies. They can well exemplify the most 
important issues China’s large SOEs face, which is the reason why we pick them up. 
 
 
III. Case I: Traditional large-scale SOEs in oligopolistic industries  
 
 
 Corporate ownership structure differs widely across industries in China. As far as the 
industrial sector is concerned, SOEs have retained their dominance in heavy industries above all, 
where entry barriers are higher due to large minimum requirement for fixed investment11.   
Figure 4 illustrates the point by showing relationship between average capital/labor 
ratio and the share of broadly-defined SOEs in 34 industrial sub-sectors. It indicates that, mainly 
on account of the continuous decline of SOEs’ share in less capital-intensive industries, capital 
                                                        
11 Except for the tobacco industry, where private capitals are basically barred out in consideration for 
preserving tax base, the great majority of mining and manufacturing industries are basically open to 
entries by private capitals. Although there still remain explicit or tacit restrictions, they tend to be 
circumvented and finally abolished. 
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intensity and the share of SOEs has become more strongly correlated. The dominance of SOEs 
still remains more or less intact in industrial sub-sectors such as mining, petrochemicals, ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals, and transportation equipment 12 . Competition do exists in these 
industries too. A handful of private companies are growing so vigorously that they may pose 
serious threat to the incumbents. However, since the scales of the incumbents, which are mostly 
state-owned, are overwhelmingly larger than the newcomers, markets remain to be oligopolistic 
at least by the standard of the highly competitive environment of the Chinese economy. 
Although few statistical data in connection with ownership attributes is available outside the 
industrial sector, it is apparent that in some highly capital-intensive service sectors such as 
telecommunication or transportation the dominance of SOEs is much more confirmed. 
 
Figure 4  Relationship between K/L ratio and the share of SOEs
by industrial sub-sector (excluding public utilities) in 1999 and 20030
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Note:
1) K/L ratio is calculated by dividing nominal fixed assets net of depreciation by the number of employees. 2) The
shares of SOEs are biased upward  because of the coverage problem of industrial statistics (see footnote 7 to the text).
Source) Calculated by the author based on Statistical Yearbook of China , various years.
 
SOE share 
Most of SOEs in these sub-sectors are traditional large SOEs. They are “traditional” in 
the sense that they are usually under more stringent control by government ministries and at the 
same time are heavily burdened with the legacy of the planned economy, such as redundant 
workforce, underperforming assets, and money-losing business units. 
The largest ones among the large SOEs in these industries, which typically employ 
more than hundreds of thousand workers, are usually under direct control of the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (????????????SASAC) of the 
                                                        
12 In some industries such as the automotive and shipbuilding industries, regulations that limit the equity 
share of foreign capitals below 50 per cent helps keep the dominance of SOEs. 
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central government13. Below we look into the case of SINOPEC Group as one of the most 
representative of traditional large SOEs in oligopolistic industries.  
    
SINOPEC Group 
 SINOPEC Group Company (??????????hereafter “the group company”) is 
the largest company in China by sales as of 2004, according to China Enterprise Confederation 
and China Enterprise Directors Association (Zhongguo Qiye Lianhehui and Zhongugo Qiyejia 
Xiehui [2005]). The group company was established as a result of a sweeping reorganization of 
the petroleum and petrochemical industries in 1998. Before the reorganization, while old 
SINOPEC had been defined as a business entity since the early 1980s, in fact it had been a 
semi-ministerial organization responsible also for the administrative control of the 
petrochemical industry. The reorganization in 1998 has produced two gigantic state-owned 
corporations that integrate development, drilling, and refining of petroleum and production of 
petrochemical products: SINOPEC, and China Natural Gas and Petroleum Group Company 
(CNPC Group). The two and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), which is also 
a WSOE, are by far the three largest competitors in China’s petroleum, natural gas, and 
petrochemical markets. All of the three companies fall under the jurisdiction of SASAC.     
 In 2000 the group company separated its core business and reorganized it into China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC Corp.), a JSC of which state-owned shares are 
entrusted with the group (Figure 5). SINOPEC Corp. had its shares listed on Hong Kong, New 
York, London, and Shanghai stock exchanges and successfully raised close to five billion US 
dollars.  
 The group company itself has remained wholly-owned by the State. Since most of 
unprofitable business units and non-business auxiliary service units have been left to the group 
company, it is losing money if the profit of SINOPEC Corp is excluded (Table 3). Still, it 
employs as many as 450,000 workforces. Legally speaking, the relationship between the group 
company and SINOPEC Corp. is a shareholding company as the single largest shareholder and 
its subsidiary listed company. However, as is illustrated by the fact that Chairman of SINOPEC 
Corp. serves also as Chief Executive Officer of the group company, in actuality the operation of 
the two companies is by no means strictly separated14.  
                                                        
13 SASAC was established in 2003 as a result of reshuffling of two organizations: the former State 
Economic and Trade Commission and the Central Enterprise Work Commission of the Party. 
14 For example, although SINOPEC Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd. is a subsidiary of SINOPEC Corp., 
the company’s auxiliary and non-business units are under the direct control of the group company 
(Interview with the group company, October 30, 2005).  
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Figure 5  Corporate structure of SINOPEC Group (as of the end of FY 2004) 
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 SINOPEC Corp. 35.041
Source) Annual reports.  
  
During the first half of 2005, SINOPEC Corp. enjoyed the historical surge in oil prices 
and saw its net profit grow by more than 20 percent year-on-year basis. Nonetheless, in the long 
run, dividends from SINOPEC Corp. do not suffice providing for more than four hundred 
thousand workforces of the group company at the same time repaying interests and principals of 
debts outstanding that amount to two thirds of the company’s total assets (net of SINOPEC 
Corp.). It is reported that, among more than 400 thousand employees of the group company, 
more than half are in non-core business or auxiliary service units, most of which are losing 
money and need to be separated out from the group15. The cost of restructuring of labor, asset 
and debt is roughly estimated to be 40 billion RMB16. The group company has to promote the 
restructuring without inflicting great social disputes17.   
Apparently, the most feasible way to finance the large-scale restructuring is divesting a 
part of the state shares of SINOPEC Corp, as the group company itself recognizes18. But hasty 
divestiture entails a great risk of drastic disruption in the stock price and/or destabilization in 
corporate management, since China is still lacking in qualified investors that have financial 
resources and managerial capability to lead the corporate governance of large public companies. 
Thus it is highly likely that SINOPEC group will remain dominated by the state capital for the 
foreseeable future. 
Being a large wholly-state owned corporation of strategic importance, the group 
company is supervised by SASAC that act as the state-shareholder. The officially-claimed 
mission of SASAC is the maximization of corporate value of companies under its supervision 
including SINOPEC Group Company. Recently SASAC is inclined to favor the idea that it will 
follow the model of Temasek, the largest Singaporean state investment company that has a high 
                                                        
15 In 2004 the central government designated three largest state-owned corporate groups, SINOPEC, 
CNPC and Dongfeng Motor Corporation as first test cases of comprehensive restructuring focused on 
separation of non-core business units.  
16 China Business Post (????), August 21, 2004. 
17 In 2002, tens of thousands of laid-off workers of Daqing Oilfield, which is a subsidiary of CNPC Group, 
demonstrated on the street in protest of scantiness of compensation. 
18 China Business Post (????), August 21, 2004. 
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international reputation as a successful institutional investor. However, at least at present the 
role of SASAC seems to be more promotion of industrial policy than maximization of corporate 
value, reflecting its previous organizational background19. The sheer size of the companies 
under its jurisdiction – 163 large SOEs covering almost all industrial and services sectors with 
assets exceeding one trillion US dollars and more than nine million employees -- also rules out a 
quick shift of SASAC to the value-maximizing investment model a la Temasek. On top of that, 
it is reported that the Party still retain the appointment power of the top management of 53 
ultra-large SOEs including SINOPEC Group Company.20 This makes “politicization” (Qian 
[1995]) of those companies’ management almost inevitable.  
 While the scale of SINOPEC Group Company is exceptionally large, its corporate 
structure and the circumstance the company faces represent to a great extent those of large 
SOEs in capital-intensive industries, where market still remains to be more or less oligopolistic. 
Many of such have separated their profitable business and reorganized them into JSCs, then had 
their shares listed. This is an important step towards full commercialization of SOEs, as the 
newly-born JSCs are free from the burden of the legacy of the planned economy (at least in 
theory) and exposed to monitoring by non-state shareholders.  
At the same time, the task of promoting further restructuring of redundant workers, 
non-performing assets and excessive debts left to the original SOEs (which usually equal the 
parent companies of JSCs) remains mind boggling. SASAC estimates that there are 
approximately 1.6 million redundant workers to be disposed of in SASAC-supervised large 
SOEs21. Assuming the average restructuring per-worker cost as three to four times of annual 
salary (sixty to eighty thousand RMB)22, the total scale of labor restructuring cost amounts to 
ninety to 130 billion RMB, which equal to 10 to 15 percent of the annual expenditure of the 
central government. As with the cost of writing off non-performing assets though no reliable 
estimate is available, there is little doubt that it exceeds the labor restructuring cost by a wide 
margin23. In view of financial constraint the central government currently faces, it is quite likely 
that it will take years for the task of restructuring of large SOEs to be completed. 
  
 
                                                        
19 See footnote 13. 
20 Finance (??), February 21, 2005.  
21 China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Yearbook 2005, p.69. 
22 This roughly corresponds to the prevailing standard of labor restructuring cost (the amount paid out to a 
worker as a compensation for the loss of job security and welfare service as a SOE employee). 
23 The total assets of SASAC-supervised SOEs at the end of 2005 is 10.6 trillion RMB. Even if we 
assume five percent of the assets to be written off, it amounts to more than fifty percent of the annual 
expenditure of the central government. 
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IV. Case II. Manager-controlled SOEs in competitive industries 
 
 
 In the previous section we noticed the fact that SOEs today are largely concentrated in 
heavy industries that remain to be relatively oligopolistic. In contrast, as can be seen from 
Figure 4 cited above, in most of less capital-intensive industries the share of SOEs is much 
lower. Especially in the least capital-intensive light industries such as apparel and footwear 
manufacturing, SOEs’ share is already close to null. 
 It is noteworthy, however, that even in those industries where the dominance of SOEs 
has long gone, there still are a handful of SOEs which survive competition and remain viable. 
They are surely anomalies in the sense that they account for a very tiny fraction of SOEs. But 
within the industries these “atypical” SOEs are often quite influential players. Below we focus 
on the case of Doublestar Group Corporation, the largest domestic maker of rubber-soled shoes. 
 
Doublestar Group Corporation24
 The shoemaking industry is, in line with other light industries, probably one of the 
most competitive and “privatized” industries in China. The domestic market of rubber-soled 
shoes is packed with a huge number of domestic manufacturers, mostly private firms or TVEs, 
Taiwanese OEMs, and major foreign brands such as Nike and Adidas. 
Doublestar Group Corporation (??????? hereafter “the corporation”) is probably the only 
SOE that remains viable in the industry. Figure 6 describes the present organizational structure 
of the corporation. It was a medium-scale factory subordinate to Qingdao Municipality 
Government, producing the cheapest type of rubber-soled shoes until the mid-1980s, when it 
faced rapid piling-up of inventory due to the abrupt change of the domestic market. Being 
unimportant factory in a non-strategic sector, the factory could enjoy little support from the 
local government. In consequence the factory’s financial position deteriorated seriously. 
The major reason the factory survived the crisis and increasingly harsh market 
competition thereafter is that it could swiftly adjust product lineup and build a marketing 
network of its own, making itself possible to go around the traditional inefficient channel of 
state-owned distributors. Along with putting great emphasis on improving product quality, the 
factory created its own brand “Doublestar” and successfully promoted the brand to the market, 
becoming the largest domestic manufacturer of rubber-soled shoes. In 1992 it changed its 
company name after the brand name and reorganized itself as “Doublestar Group Corporation,” 
a wholly-state-owned limited liabilities company under the direct supervision of Qingdao 
                                                        
24 Description of the corporation is based on two interviews on September 20, 1996 and October 28, 2005, 
annual reports of Qingdao Doublestar Co., Ltd. and various materials. 
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Municipality Government25.  
  
  
Figure 6  Corporate structure of Doublestar Group (as of the end of FY 2004) 
 
Qingdao Doublestar Co., Ltd.  
Listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Total assets: 2.5 billion RMB 
Employees: 9,033 
Doublestar Group Corporation 
Total assets: 5.5 billon RMB 
Employees: approximately 40,000 
(Consolidated) 
47.86? (state-owned shares) 
Q/D Tire Industrial Co. 
Q/D Forging Machinery Co. 
Q/D Plastic & Rubbery Machinery Co. 
Q/D Tire Marketing Co. 
Q/D Embroidery Industrial Co. 
Other subsidiaries and business units 
(including shoe factories) 
Q/D Group Fuel Co. 
Q/D Group Procurement Co. 
?????? Q/D Group Trading Division 
Q/D Group Staining Co. 
Q/D Group R&D Center 
Q/D Group Export Shoe Factory
Q/D Mingren Industrial Corp.
Partially owned by Wang Hai and 
other managerial staff of the group
Regional marketing subsidiaries 
(Wholly-owned subsidiaries) 
* “Q/D” stands for “Qingdao Doublestar”. 
Other subsidiaries and business 
units (including shoe factories) 
(Wholly- or partially-owned subsidiaries)
100? 
SASAC of Qingdao Municipality Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source) Annual reports and interviews by the author and others.   
 
The corporation soon established a JSC consisting of a part of its shoemaking business 
and listed it on Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1996. However, a large part of the original 
business including the production of low-end rubber-soled shoes, has remained as business units 
within the corporation. The listed company has been diversifying into the tire industry by 
                                                        
25 Before the corporatization the factory had been supervised by the Bureau of Chemical Industry of the 
municipality government. The bureau was later abolished together with other industrial bureaus.  
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acquiring several tire manufacturers in recent years.  
The corporation is one of the few SOEs in Qingdao that have been successfully 
adapted to ever-changing market environment of the transition period. It is widely 
acknowledged that the success of the corporation is to a great extent attributable to President 
Wang Hai (??), an army veteran who was appointed as Party Secretary of the original factory 
in 1983 and has been commanding control of management thereafter. While the corporation 
itself still remains to be a WSOE supervised by the Qingdao Municipality Government, the 
local government rarely intervenes into the management of the corporation. The management 
control of the corporation is so centralized that any nonrecurring expenditure exceeding two 
thousand RMB requires approval by the president26. In principle a manager of SOE has to retire 
at the age of 60. But the municipality government decided in 2005 to grant three CEOs of two 
SOEs and one urban collective enterprise, including Wang Hai, who was already 63 at that time, 
three years’ special term extension27. The behavior of the Qingdao Municipality Government to 
a large extent reflects the market oriented nature of local governments in China, which is 
particularly evident in the coastal region where market competition prevails. 
 The management of the corporation is so personalized that it looks quite close to a 
private enterprise. As result of rapid expansion the majority of workforces are migrant workers 
from rural areas, making the corporation capable of flexibly adjusting labor in response to the 
market. The dilemma is, however, as long as it remains wholly owned by the State, the 
municipality government retains the ultimate control right of the corporation. The president has 
no legal claim to the net assets of the corporation, although it is no doubt that as a virtual 
entrepreneur he has made an essential contribution for creating it. 
 The obvious solution to this dilemma is privatization. But the central government still 
takes a negative stance against privatizing large SOEs. It strictly prohibits giving-out or 
“underpriced” selling of state shares of large SOEs to managers by local governments. Besides, 
it is extremely difficult to sort out exactly what amount of equity the president can justifiably 
claim. Notwithstanding these constraints, the corporation seems to be already preparing for 
promoting privatization by a more of less covert way probably with a tacit approval of the 
municipality government. It established Qingdao Doublestar Mingren Industrial Co., Ltd. 
(Mingren Industrial) , a JSC with its shares jointly owned by the corporation and a group of 
senior managerial staff including Wang Hai28. The corporation owns only the minority of 
Mingren Industrial’s shares, while exactly how many shares are owned by Wang Hai and others 
                                                        
26 Interview with managerial staff of the corporation (October 28, 2005). However, how exactly this rule 
is obeyed is questionable. 
27 The other two are CEOs of Haier and Tsingtao Beer, both of which are widely known as successful 
survivors among public enterprises in extremely competitive industries.   
28 Incidentally, Mingren (??) means “celebrity” in Chinese.  
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remains undisclosed. The corporation has begun to use the brand name of “Doublestar Mingren” 
interchangeably with the original “Doublestar” brand, which suggests that Mingren Industrial 
will become the future platform of privatization of the corporation.     
There are several outstanding SOEs like Doublestar, which have survived the 
challenge of transition to a market economy and realized spectacular growth so far under the 
initiative of managers who functioned exactly as entrepreneurs, while they are the minority 
distinctive from the majority of SOEs in China that remain inadaptable to the market economy. 
They can be labeled as “manager-controlled” SOEs, in view of the extreme concentration of 
control to the managers. Those companies face the same dilemma as Doublestar does29. 
Generally speaking, local governments in charge of supervising them are inclined to “let them 
go off” by granting managers state equities at prices lower-than book value or just without 
charge. On the other hand, the central government put stringent restrictions on MBO or MEBO 
of large SOEs as it has strong interest in securing the source of financing SOE restructuring and 
filling the serious shortage of pension fund due to the painstaking transition from the 
pay-as-you-go system to the fully-funded system. The central government also worries that once 
the restrictions are relaxed local government are apt to rush for wholesaling of SOEs with 
massive discount, which may arouse discontent on the side of workers, as the ongoing 
experience of the privatization of small and medium SOEs illustrates.  
 
 
V. Prospect: Groping for a way out 
           
  
In recent years there have been a growing number of econometric studies focusing on 
assessing the effects of corporate ownership on efficiency in China30. Despite wide divergences 
in methods applied and specific conclusions, most of the studies agree that state ownership is 
detrimental to efficiency, thus supporting privatization either explicitly or implicitly. We need to 
note, however, the fact that the superiority of private ownership does not mean that state-owned 
enterprises can be privatized right away.  
The Party and the central government have long recognized that corporatization and 
diversification of ownership of large SOEs are necessary both for efficient management and 
effective governance. Since the late 1990s to the beginning of the century they have further 
conceded a gradual exit of state investment from “non-strategic sectors”, which are rather 
                                                        
29 Huang [2003] explores the failure case of privatization of Mailyard Group, once the largest OEM 
manufacturer of men’s suits for the Japanese market, which was also a typical case of 
“privately-controlled” SOE.   
30 For example see Tian [2001] and Liu [2003]. 
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vaguely defined as sectors in which market mechanism function works sufficiently and that do 
not concern with fundamental development of the economy and national security. They have 
also acknowledged that the dominance of state investment in listed SCEs needs to be decreased 
whichever industry they belong to31.  
In spite of these progresses in the political arena, our estimate indicates that the share 
of broadly-defined SOEs has remained basically unchanged since the late 1990s. In the 
preceding two sections we looked into two cases of distinctive types of SOEs that remain viable. 
They are in a clear contrast with each other, especially in the sense that their survival and 
success in the markets depends respectively on oligopolistic position and improvisational 
entrepreneurship. At the same time, both of them capitalized the emergence of stock markets 
beginning in the late 1990s for financing their rapid expansion and diversification. The two cases 
illustrate several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of 
restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the 
interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs.  
In 2005 the government set off a comprehensive scheme of step-by-step conversion of 
state-owned shares and non-state-owned legal persons’ shares, both of which were previously 
defined as non-tradable shares, into tradable shares, i.e. shares that can be freely traded on the 
stock exchanges. No doubt the conversion, now underway at an unprecedented pace, will be a 
big step towards establishing a well-functioning market of corporate ownership. But how far the 
reform will reshape the current ownership structure of large corporations in China in coming 
years remains to be an open question.  
Apparently, foreign capital and private enterprises are the major candidates that will 
replace the State as the dominant shareholder of large corporations. Acquisitions of large SOEs 
or a part of their equity by foreign capital have been surely increasing; on the other hand, at 
least at present, they are by and large concentrated a limited number of industries where 
regulations and/or existing network in the domestic market induce foreign investors favor 
acquiring incumbent Chinese companies (e.g. the banking industry and the beer industry). 
Private enterprises are growing rapidly, some of which have the financial capability to acquire a 
number of large SOEs. However, it is often the case that those emerging companies by 
themselves, having grown out of nothing within a very short period of time, lacks internal 
stability to be capable of managing large complex organizations such as China’s SOEs32. 
                                                        
31 The Party still emphasizes keeping control of the most important large SOEs. To what extent the Party 
will concede diversification of corporate ownership of these companies is a very political issue, which we 
cannot afford to discuss further here. 
32 D’Long Group (????)’s rise and fall is the case in point. D’Long, established as a small business 
concern by the Tang brothers and grew mainly stock market speculation, acquired four stock-stock listed 
SOEs in succession within several years beginning in the late 1990s. The group, however, fall 
dramatically due to excessive debt burden and the sudden tightening of monetary policy in early 2004, 
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 Then emerges our last question: what kind of consequences will the persistence of 
state-ownership have on China’s economy? On surface, with the aggregated saving rate being 
close to 40 per cent, the momentum of the growth does not seem to be seriously hurt by 
inefficiency in resource allocation. Besides, competition in the product markets will continue to 
exercise pressure on surviving SOEs to improve efficiency, so as to make them converge to the 
behavior model of private enterprises.  
At the same time, however, in view of the Chinese government’s strong orientation for 
pursuing high speed growth and underdevelopment of monitoring by outside investors, it is 
highly likely that state-ownership will remain to be an important source of short-term 
macroeconomic instability by encouraging excessive investment. Furthermore, in the long run, 
in order to sustain growth momentum China needs industrial upgrading, which is to be 
supported by evolution of corporate organization. Weakness inherent in corporate governance 
under state ownership will be one of the central issues that must be addressed in the process.   
                                                                                                                                                                  
leaving debts as much as ten billon RMB approximately.   
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